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PRIMITIVITY OF THE GROUP OF A CIPHER INVOLVING THE
ACTION OF THE KEY-SCHEDULE∗
MARCO CALDERINI†
Abstract. In this work we study the group generated by the encryption functions of a block
cipher. The structure of such a group depends on the key schedule algorithm used for generating
the round keys, and for such a reason, in general, it could be not easy to study this group. We give
two properties for the key-schedule of a block cipher for which it is possible to identify sufficient
conditions that permit to guarantee the primitivity of this group and the security of the cipher with
respect to the partition-based trapdoor. This type of trapdoor has been, recently, introduced by
Bannier et al. (2016) and it is a generalization of that introduced by Paterson in 1999.
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1. Introduction. Since the work [13], where Coppersmith and Grossman con-
sidered a set of functions, to define a block cipher, and studied the permutation group
generated by these, much attention has been devoted to the group generated by the
round functions of a block cipher (see for instance [2, 9, 15, 20]). Investigating the
group theoretic structure of a block cipher is important for identifying and excluding
undesirable properties. In this context, Paterson [19] showed that the imprimitivity of
the group generated by the round functions of a block cipher can represent a weakness
exploitable for constructing a trapdoor. By a trapdoor it is meant an algebraic struc-
ture, hidden in the cipher design, that would allow an attacker to break the cipher
easily.
Most modern block ciphers belong to two families of symmetric cryptosystems,
that is, Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN) and Feistel Networks (FN). In this
paper, we focus on iterated block ciphers of type SPN using the XOR operation for
key addition. In [9], these type of ciphers have been also called translation-based (tb)
ciphers. For a tb cipher C, in [2, 3, 9], the authors study the group generated by
the round functions of C, Γ∞(C), providing cryptographic conditions on the S-Boxes
and the mixing layer which guarantee the primitivity of the group. In a recent work
[4] (see also [5]), the authors introduce and study the partition-based trapdoor. This
algebraic trapdoor generalizes that introduced by Paterson.
In [8] the author shows that studying the group generated by the round functions
could be not enough to guarantee the security of the cipher with respect to the im-
primitivity and/or partition based trapdoor (see [8, Section 4]). For such a reason,
in [8] it has been studied a subgroup of the group generated by the round functions,
namely the group generated by the encryption functions with independent round keys
Γind(C). In [8] cryptographic properties on the S-boxes of the block cipher, sufficient
to guarantee the security of such a group to these trapdoors, are given.
From the results of these previous works, we have which properties of the com-
ponents of the round functions of the cipher can guarantee that the trapdoors cannot
work for all encryption functions, when we have independent round-keys uniformly
distributed.
In this work, we focus on the group generated by the encryption functions of a
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cipher C, Γ(C). Note that such a group depends on the key-schedule algorithm, and
it is contained in the group generated by the encryption functions with independent
round-keys. We are interested in investigating such a group, since as for the case of
the group generated by the round functions, it could be that also the security of the
group studied in [8] cannot guarantee the security of the cipher if the key-schedule
does not generate independent round-keys.
Since Γ(C) is the smallest group containing the encryption functions of C, it is
important to understand its properties. However, studying such a group it is not easy,
in general, since it strictly depends on the round-keys generated by the key-schedule
algorithm. In this work, we want to investigate some properties of the key-schedule
and of the components of the round functions of the cipher that permit to determine
the security of the cipher C with respect to the algebraic attack of the partition-based
trapdoor and, thus, the primitivity of the group Γ(C).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall some definitions and
give some results presented in [4, 8]. In Section 3, we report our study on the group
Γ(C). In particular, in the first part of Section 3 we give a first property for the key-
schedule, based on having independent round keys on three rounds. This permits to
use the cryptographic properties given in [8] also for avoiding the partition trapdoor
and obtain the primitivity of Γ(C). In the second part, we consider a subgroup T of
order 2n−1 of the translation group and analyze the possible partitions which can be
mapped one into the other by T . From such analysis we are able to provide a weaker
property for the key-schedule algorithm, for which is possible to identify cryptographic
properties for obtaining the primitivity for the group Γ(C).
2. Preliminaries and notation. Let C be a block cipher acting on a message
space V = (F2)n, for some n ≥ 1. Let K be the keys space. Then our cipher C is
given by a family of key-dependent permutations τk, called encryption functions,
C = {τk | k ∈ K}.
We are interested in studying the algebraic properties of the group Γ(C) = 〈τk |
k ∈ K〉. The study of Γ(C) is a difficult task, in general.
For the well-known cipher DES, the are some works analyzing the group Γ(DES)
(see for instance [10, 12]). In these works, using some weak-keys generated by the
key-schedule of DES, it is provided a lower bound on the order of this group. These
lower bounds permit to prove also that 3-DES is different from DES. To the best of
our knowledge, these works, focusing on the cipher DES, are the only ones studying
the properties of Γ(C) for a given block cipher C.
2.1. Translation based ciphers. Most modern block ciphers are obtained by
a composition of several key-dependent permutations, called round functions. That
is, any encryption function τk, of a cipher C, is a composition of some permutations
τk,1, ..., τk,ℓ of V . Here we consider translation-based cipher, introduced in [9].
Let m, b > 1 and
V = V1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Vb,
where the spaces Vi’s are isomorphic to (F2)m.
We will denote the group of all permutations on V by Sym(V ). Given v ∈ V , we
denote by σv ∈ Sym(V ) the translation of V mapping x to x + v. The group of all
translations of V will be denoted by T (V ). In the following, the action of g ∈ Sym(V )
on an element v ∈ V will be written as vg.
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For any element v ∈ V , we can write v = v1⊕· · ·⊕ vb, for same vi ∈ Vi. The map
πi : V → Vi is the projection mapping v 7→ vi.
A permutation γ ∈ Sym(V ) acting as vγ = v1γ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ vbγb, for all v ∈ V
and for some fixed γi ∈ Sym(Vi), is called parallel map (or “parallel S-box”) and
any γi is called S-box. In the cryptographic context, a linear map λ : V → V is
traditionally said “Mixing Layer” when used in composition with parallel maps, in
the round functions of a cipher.
For any I ⊂ {1, ..., b}, with I 6= ∅ and I 6= {1, ..., b}, we define
⊕
i∈I Vi a wall.
Definition 2.1. A linear map λ ∈ GL(V ) is called a proper mixing layer if no
wall is invariant under λ. Moreover, we say that λ is strongly-proper if no wall is
mapped in another wall.
We can characterize translation-based block ciphers by the following:
Definition 2.2 ([9]). A block cipher C = {τk | k ∈ K} over F2 is called
translation-based (tb) if:
1 it is the composition of a finite number of rounds, ℓ, such that any round τk,h
is given by the composition of three maps γh, λh and σkh , where
- γh is a parallel S-box (depending on the round but not on k) and 0γh =
01,
- λh is a linear map (depending on the round but not on k),
- σkh is the translation by the round key (it depends on both k and the
round),
2 for at least one round, we have (at the same time) that λh is proper and that
the map Φh : K → V given by k 7→ kh is surjective.
The round-keys are determined by a key-schedule algorithm, which is a map Φ :
K → V ℓ, k 7→ (k1, ..., kℓ). The map Φh in Definition 2.2 is given by πh ◦ Φ.
The tb charaterization allowed the authors of [9] to investigate the permutation
group generated by the round functions of C. In particular, for any round h, let
Γh(C) = 〈τk,h | k ∈ K〉,
therefore, we can define the group containing Γ(C) generated by the round functions
Γ∞(C) = 〈Γh(C) | h = 1, ..., ℓ〉.
As shown in [8], studying the group generated by the round functions could be
not enough to guarantee the security of the cipher or of the group Γ(C). For this
reason the author studied the group
Γind(C) = 〈τK | K ∈ V
ℓ〉,
where, letting K = (k1, ..., kℓ), τK is the encryption function obtained using kh ∈ V
as round-key at round h for any 1 ≤ h ≤ ℓ. Clearly, Γind is such that
Γ(C) ⊆ Γind(C) ⊆ Γ∞(C).
In the following we will consider as tb ciphers all the ciphers that satisfy just the
first condition in Definition 2.2.
1 The assumption 0γh = 0 is not restrictive. Indeed, we can always include 0γh in the round key
addition of the previous round (see [9, Remark 3.3]).
4 MARCO CALDERINI
2.2. Boolean functions. Let m ≥ 1, and let f : (F2)m → (F2)m be a vectorial
Boolean function. The derivative of f in the direction u ∈ (F2)m is given by fˆu(x) =
f(x+ u) + f(x).
Definition 2.3. Let f be a vectorial Boolean function, define for any a, b ∈ (F2)m
δf (a, b) = |{x ∈ (F2)
m | fˆa(x) = b}|.
Then, f is said differentially δ-uniform if
δ = max
a,b∈(F2)
m,
a6=0
δf (a, b) .
Vectorial Boolean functions, having a low differential uniformity, may prevent
differential cryptanalysis (introduced by Biham and Shamir [6]) when used as S-boxes
in block ciphers. From this point of view, functions having differential 2-uniformity
(the smallest possible in even characteristic) are optimal. Functions differentially
2-uniform are called almost perfect nonlinear (APN).
By [9, Fact 3], a vectorial Boolean function differentially δ-uniform satisfies
|Im(fˆu)| ≥
2m
δ
.
Moreover, in a similar way, we can see that for any subset S of (F2)m,
|fˆu(S)| ≥
|S|
δ
.
Definition 2.4. Let 1 ≤ r < m and f(0) = 0, we say that f is strongly r-anti-
invariant if, for any two subspaces U and W of (F2)m such that f(U) = W , then
either dim(U) = dim(W ) < m− r or U = W = (F2)m.
2.3. Partition-based trapdoors. Let G ⊆ Sym(V ) be a permutation sub-
group. G is called primitive if it has no nontrivial G-invariant partition of V . That
is, there does not exist a nontrivial partition A 6= {{v} | v ∈ V }, {V } of V , such that
Ag ∈ A for all A ∈ A and g ∈ G. On the other hand, if a nontrivial G-invariant
partition exists, the group is called imprimitive.
As said above an undesirable property of the group Γ∞(C) is the imprimitivity.
Indeed, Paterson in [19] constructs a DES-like cipher whoce group generated by round
functions is imprimitive. Using this property he is able to mount an attack on the
cipher.
From the idea of the imprimitive action trapdoor, in a recent work [4], Bannier
et al. introduce the partition-based trapdoor. In this work the authors give some
conditions to construct a tb cipher whose encryption functions associate a partition
A of the space V to a partition B.
In the following, we report some definitions and results from [4].
Definition 2.5. Let ρ be a permutation of V and A,B be two partitions of V .
Let Aρ = {Aρ | A ∈ A}. We say that ρ maps A to B if and only if Aρ = B. Moreover,
let G be a permutation group we say that G maps A to B if, for all ρ ∈ G not the
identity, ρ maps A to B. In particular, an imprimitive permutation group is such that
G maps A to A.
Definition 2.6. A partition A of V is said linear if there exists a subspace U of
V such that
A = {U + v | v ∈ V }.
We denote with L(U) such a partition.
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For the translation group, we have the following charaterization of the possible
partition A and B such that T (V ) maps A to B.
Proposition 2.7 ([16]). Let A and B be two partitions of V = (F2)d. Then the
permutation group T (V ) maps A to B if and only if A = B and A is a linear partition.
Focusing on the mixing-layer we have.
Proposition 2.8 ([4]). Let λ be a linear permutation of V and let U be a
subspace of V . Then L(U)λ = L(Uλ).
For tb ciphers with independent round keys we have the following.
Theorem 2.9 ([4, 8]). Let C be a translation based cipher on V . Suppose that
there exist A and B non-trivial partitions such that for all ℓ-tuples of round-keys
k = (k1, ..., kℓ) the encryption function τk maps A to B. Define A1 = A and for
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ Ai+1 = Aiτi, where τi = γiλi is the i-th round function without the round
key translation, and suppose also that τ1 is the identity map. Then
• Aℓ+1 = B
• for any 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ+ 1 Ai is a linear partition.
Remark 2.10. Since τ1 is the identity then the first round is represented by a
whitening (i.e. adding only the round key) and the only partitions which can be
mapped by T (V ) into another partition are linear. However, if τ1 is not the identity
map, then we might have A1 non-linear, indeed it may happen that the first parallel
S-box maps a non-linear partition A1 into the partition A′ = A1γ1. But then, A2 =
A′λ1 has to be linear since for the first round key we can have all possible translations.
From [8], we have the following sufficient conditions to avoid the partition trap-
door in Γind(C).
Theorem 2.11. Let C be a tb cipher with ℓ rounds. Let h < ℓ be such that the
mixing layer λh is strongly proper and the parallel S-boxes of round h and round h+1,
γh and γh+1, are composed by S-boxes which are
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m,
2. strongly (r − 1)-anti-invariant.
Then, there do not exist A and B non-trivial partitions such that for all ℓ-tuple of
round keys the encryption functions map A to B. In particular Γind(C) is primitive.
3. On the algebraic properties of Γ(C). In this section, we focus on the group
Γ(C). Studying the group Γ(C) is not an easy task, because such a group depends
strongly on the key-schedule algorithm. For this reason, usually, it has been studied
the group Γ∞(C) and Γind(C) (more recently). We will give two properties for the
algorithm of a key-schedule such that, if one of these is satisfied, then it is possible to
individuate sufficient conditions for avoiding the partition trapdoors.
The first property for the key-schedule permits to avoid the trapdoor using the
same conditions of Theorem 2.11. In the following we will denote by Φ the key-
schedule algorithm, which is the map from K to V ℓ, associating the master key k to
the round keys (k1, ..., kℓ).
Definition 3.1. Let C be a tb cipher over V , with key space K. Let ℓ be the
number of the rounds. Suppose that there exists 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1 such that for any
(ki−1, ki, ki+1) ∈ V
3 the element (k¯1, ..., k¯i−2, ki−1, ki, ki+1, k¯i+2, ..., k¯ℓ) is in Im(Φ),
where the values k¯j’s are fixed. Then we say that the key-schedule Φ is 3-rounds
independent at round i.
We need the following result from [8].
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Proposition 3.2. Let γ be a parallel map, i.e. γ = (γ1, ..., γb) with γi ∈ Sym(Vi)
for all i. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m,
2. strongly (r − 1)-anti-invariant.
Let L(U) and L(W ) be non-trivial linear partitions of V , then γ maps L(U) to L(W )
if and only if U and W are walls, in particular U = W .
Theorem 3.3. Let C be a tb cipher with a key-schedule Φ 3-round independent
at round i, for some 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1. Then, if the parallel S-boxes of round i and round
i + 1, γi and γi+1, satisfy Condition 1) and 2) of Proposition 3.2 and λi is strongly
proper, there do not exist A and B non-trivial partitions such that for all k ∈ K the
map τk maps A onto B. In particular, Γ(C) is primitive and it is not weak with respect
to the partition-based trapdoor.
Proof. Since Φ is 3-round independent at round i, there exist some fixed values
k¯j , with j ∈ {1, ..., ℓ}\{i−1, i, i+1}, such that (k¯1, ..., ki−1, ki, ki+1, ..., k¯ℓ) is in Im(Φ),
for any (ki−1, ki, ki+1) ∈ V 3.
Denoting by τj = γjλj , let us consider the encryption maps
τK = τ1σk¯1 · · · τi−2σk¯i−2τi−1σki−1τiσkiτi+1σki+1τi+2σk¯i+2 · · · τℓσk¯ℓ .
Denoting by τ¯1 = τ1σk¯1 · · · τi−2σk¯i−2τi−1 and by τ¯2 = τi+2σk¯i+2 · · · τℓσk¯ℓ , we have that
these maps are given by
(3.1) τ¯1σki−1γiλiσkiγi+1λi+1σki+1 τ¯2,
where (ki−1, ki, ki+1) ∈ V 3. Suppose that there exist A and B non-trivial partitions
such that any encryption function τk (and in particular those as in (3.1)) maps A onto
B. Denote by A1 = Aτ¯1, A2 = A1γiλi, A3 = A2γi+1λi+1. From Theorem 2.9, since
we can have all possible translations for σki−1 we have that A1 is a linear partition,
otherwise T (V ) cannot map it in another partition. As well A2 and A3 have to be
linear. Thus, there exist three vector subspaceW1,W2 andW3 such that L(Wj) = Aj
for j = 1, 2, 3.
From Proposition 3.2 it follows that W1,W2 and W3 are walls. But, this implies that
W2 =W1λi (see Proposition 2.8) which is not possible since λi is strongly-proper.
In the following, we want to consider key-schedules for which the property in
Definition 3.1 does not hold for all possible round keys in the three consecutive rounds.
In particular, we will consider the case when for these three rounds the keys are
contained in some subgroup T ′ ⊆ T ((F2)n) (maybe not the same for all the three
rounds) of order 2n−1 (half of the possible round keys).
In order to study this case, we need to characterize the pairs of partitions A,B
for which T ′ maps A onto B. Before to give such a characterization we will define the
following partition of (F2)n.
Definition 3.4. Let U be a vector subspace of (F2)n of dimension n− 1. Let W1
and W2 two distinct subspace of U . We define the partition of (F2)n
LAU (W1|W2) = {W1 + v : v ∈ U} ∪ {(W2 + v¯) + v : v ∈ U}
for any v¯ ∈ (F2)n \ U . We will call LAU (W1|W2) a linear-affine partition.
Note that if W1 = W2, then the partition is linear.
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Remark 3.5. Let v¯ ∈ (F2)n \U , the space (F2)n can be divided into U and U + v¯.
Then a linear-affine partition LAU (W1|W2) is just a linear partition restricted to U ,
L(W1), plus another linear partition L(W2), always restricted to U , translated by the
vector v¯. That is, L(W1) is a partition for U and v¯ + L(W2) is a partition for U + v¯.
Proposition 3.6. Let V = (F2)n and T ′ be a subgroup of T (V ) of order 2n−1.
Let A and B be two partitions of V . Then, the permutation subgroup T ′ maps A to
B if and only if
• A = B and
• A is a linear partition, L(W ), or A is linear-affine partition LAU (W1|W2),
where U = {v : σv ∈ T ′}.
Proof. It is easy to check that if A is linear or linear-affine, then it is mapped by
T ′ into itself.
Let us consider two partition A and B and suppose that T ′ maps A into B. Let
U = {v : σv ∈ T ′} be generated by v1, ..., vn−1 (since T ′ is a subgroup of order 2n−1,
U is a subspace of dimension n−1). Denote by A0 and B0 the blocks of the partitions
which contain 0. We can have two cases
1. A0 ⊆ U
2. ∃v¯ ∈ A0 such that v¯ /∈ U
Consider the first case. Then, A0 is a vector subspace. Indeed, for any v ∈ A0
we have 0 ∈ A0σv and thus A0σv = B0. Moreover, we have also v ∈ B0. This implies
A0 = B0 and A0σv = A0 for all v in A0. So, A0 is a vector subspace.
Then, for all v in U the set A0 + v is a block of B and these blocks form a partition
for U and, obviously, A0 + v is also a block of A since σ−1v = σv.
Now, in a similar way, we can fix v¯ /∈ U and consider Av¯ and Bv¯, the blocks
containing the vector v¯. Since {A0+v}v∈U is a partition for U we have that Av¯ ⊆ U+v¯
and also Bv¯ ⊆ U + v¯.
Let A′ = Av¯ + v¯ and B
′ = Bv¯ + v¯. A
′, B′ ⊆ U are vector subspaces and A′ = B′.
Indeed, for any v ∈ A′ we have Av¯σv = Bv¯, since v¯ ∈ Av¯σv. Moreover, v + v¯ ∈ Bv¯
and, since Bv¯σv = Av¯, v + v¯ ∈ Av¯. Thus, Av¯ = Bv¯ and it is an affine subspace,
implying that A′ = B′ and A′ is a vector subspace.
The blocks Av¯ + v with v in U form a partition of U + v¯. Now, if A
′ = A0 then A is
linear, otherwise A = LAU (A0|A′).
For the second case, we have that there exists v¯ ∈ A0 such that v¯ /∈ U . Let
W = A0 ∩ U . For any v ∈ W we have that A0σv = B0 since 0 ∈ A0σv and also that
v ∈ B0. Moreover, we have that B0σv = A0 for all v in W . Which implies that for
any v1, v2 ∈ W , v1 + v2 ∈ A0. Since v1 + v2 is also in U , v1 + v2 ∈ W and thus W is
a vector subspace.
In a similar way, we have also that W + v¯ ⊆ A0 and W + v¯ ⊆ B0. Now, suppose that
W ∪W + v¯ ( A0. Then, there exists w ∈ A0∩U+ v¯ with w /∈W + v¯. Thus, w = v¯+u
for some u in U \W . But then, A0σu = B0 since v¯ ∈ B0. Moreover, B0σu = A0
implies that u ∈ A0 which is not possible. Thus, A0 = W ∪W + v¯ = B0. So, A0 is a
vector subspace and it is easy to check that {A0 + v : v ∈ U} is a partition of (F2)n
and A = B = L(A0).
For a given permutation γ which maps a linear (linear-affine) partition into an-
other one we have the following properties.
Lemma 3.7. Let γ ∈ Sym(V ) with 0γ = 0. Then:
(i) If γ maps L(W ) to L(W ′), then for any u ∈ W γˆu(V ) ⊆W ′.
(ii) If γ maps L(W ) to LAU (W1|W2), then
8 MARCO CALDERINI
– for any u ∈W γˆu(S) ⊆W1, where S = Uγ−1, and
– for any u ∈W γˆu(S′) ⊆W2 where S′ = (U+ v¯)γ−1 and v¯ is any element
in V \ U .
(iii) If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to L(W ), then
– for any u ∈W1 γˆu(U) ⊆W , and
– for any u ∈W2 γˆu(U + v¯) ⊆W .
(iv) If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to LAU ′ (W ′1|W
′
2), then
– for any u ∈W1 γˆu(S) ⊆W ′1 where S = U ∩ U
′γ−1,
– for any u ∈ W2 γˆu(S′) ⊆W ′1, where S
′ = (U + v¯) ∩ U ′γ−1 and v¯ is any
element in V \ U .
While,
– for any u ∈ W1 γˆu(S) ⊆W ′2, where S = U ∩ (U
′+ v¯′)γ−1, and v¯′ is any
element in V \ U .
– for any u ∈ W2 γˆu(S′) ⊆W ′2, where S
′ = (U + v¯) ∩ (U ′ + v¯′)γ−1 and v¯
is any v /∈ U , v¯′ is any element in V \ U .
Proof.
(i) Since γ maps L(W ) into L(W ′) and 0γ = 0 we haveWγ = W ′. Moreover, for any
v ∈ V we have (W+v)γ =W ′+vγ. Then, let u ∈W , for any v ∈ V (v+u)γ ∈W ′+vγ
and (v + u)γ + vγ = γˆu(v) ∈W
′.
(ii) Let S = Uγ−1. For any s ∈ S, sγ is contained in W1 + sγ. Then, for any
s ∈ S (W + s)γ = W1 + sγ and we have (u + s)γ + sγ = γˆu(s) ∈ W1. On the other
hand, consider S′ = (U + v¯)γ−1. For any s ∈ S′ sγ = w + v¯ for some w ∈ U and
(W + s)γ =W2 + sγ. Thus, let u ∈W , for any s ∈ S′ γˆu(s) ∈W2.
(iii) Now we have W1γ = W and (W2 + v¯)γ = W + v¯. Let u ∈ W1, since for any
v ∈ U (W1 + v)γ = W + vγ we have γˆu(v) ∈ W . While, if we consider v ∈ U + v¯, we
have v = w + v¯ for some w ∈ U , and (W2 + v)γ = W + vγ. This implies that, fixed
u ∈W2, for any v ∈ U + v¯, γˆu(v) ∈ W .
(iv) Let S = U ∩U ′γ−1. For any s ∈ S we have s ∈ W1+s and (W1+s)γ = W ′1+sγ.
As before, for any fixed u ∈ W1 we obtain γˆu(s) ∈ W ′1 for any s ∈ S. Similarly,
let S′ = (U + v¯) ∩ U ′γ−1. For any s ∈ S we have s = (w + v¯), s ∈ W2 + s and
(W2 + s)γ = W
′
1 + sγ. Let u ∈W2 fixed, we obtain γˆu(s) ∈W
′
1 for any s ∈ S
′.
On the other hand, consider S = U ∩ (U ′ + v¯′)γ−1. Now, for any s ∈ S we have
s ∈W1 + s, sγ = w′ + v¯′ for some w′ ∈ U ′, and (W1 + s)γ = W ′2 + sγ. Fixed u ∈W1,
we obtain γˆu(s) ∈ W ′2 for any s ∈ S.
In a similar way, we have that, letting S′ = (U + v¯) ∩ (U ′ + v¯′)γ−1 and u ∈ W2,
γˆu(s) ⊆W ′2 for any element s in S
′.
Let V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb, dim(V ) = n and Vi = (F2)m. For any subspace U of
dimension n− 1 we can define the set
JU = {j : Vj ∩ U ( Vj}.
Note that, since dim(U) = n− 1 for any j ∈ JU we have dim(U ∩ Vj) = m− 1.
In the following, we will characterize the possibles linear and linear-affine par-
titions which can be mapped one into another by a parallel map, satisfying some
cryptographic conditions. In particular, given a parallel map γ, we need to consider
the cases:
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1. γ maps a linear partition into a linear-affine partition.
2. γ maps a linear-affine partition into a linear partition.
3. γ maps a linear-affine partition into a linear-affine partition.
Note that the case “γ maps a linear partition into a linear partition” is given in
Proposition 3.2.
Lemma 3.8. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb, with
Vi = (F2)m, 0γ = 0. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
2. strongly r-anti-invariant.
If γ maps L(W ) to LAU (W1|W2), then W , W1 and W2 are wall and W = W1 = W2.
In particular, LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
Proof. Let I = {i : πi(W ) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I s.t. Vi ∩W (
Vi. First of all, there exists u ∈ Vi ∩W non zero. Indeed, consider any u ∈ W with
πi(u) 6= 0 (such an element exists since i ∈ I). Let S = Uγ
−1, since γ is parallel we
have that S′ = S ∩ Vi = (U ∩ Vi)γ−1. Moreover, |S′| ≥ 2m−1 (|U ∩ Vi| = 2m−1 if
i ∈ JU ). From Lemma 3.7 we have that γˆu(S′) ⊆W1 and |γˆu(S′)| ≥ |S′|/2r ≥ 2.
Since 0γ = 0 we have Wγ = W1 and uγ ∈W1. Thus, γˆu(S′) + uγ ⊆W1 ∩ Vi and
there exists w 6= 0 in W1 ∩ Vi = (W ∩ Vi)γ, implying that there exists u nonzero in
W ∩ Vi.
Now, let u 6= 0 ∈ W ∩ Vi, γˆu(S′) = γˆi,u(S′) ⊆W1 ∩ Vi, which implies |W1 ∩ Vi| ≥
2m−r−1+1 (note that |γˆi,u(S′)| ≥ 2m−r−1 and 0 /∈ γˆi,u(S′) since γi is a permutation).
Thus, dim(W1∩Vi) ≥ m−r which is not possible, since γi is strongly r-anti-invariant.
Thus, we have that W is a wall and since γ is a parallel map W =W1. Moreover,
we have that for all i ∈ JU Vi *W . Fix any i ∈ JU , we can choose v¯ ∈ Vi and v¯ /∈ U .
Denoting by v = v¯γ−1, we have (W + v)γ = W2+ v¯. Since W is a wall, γ is a parallel
map and v, v¯ ∈ Vi it is easy to check that also W2 is a wall and W2 = W . Since
W1 =W2 the partition LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
If we know a priori the n−1 dimensional vector space U , linked to the linear-affine
partition, then we can obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.9. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb,
with Vi = (F2)m, 0γ = 0. Let U be a vector space of dimension n − 1 and suppose
that for all i /∈ JU γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m,
2. strongly r − 1-anti-invariant.
otherwise for j ∈ JU γj is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
2. strongly r-anti-invariant.
If γ maps L(W ) to LAU (W1|W2), then W , W1 and W2 are wall and W = W1 = W2.
In particular, LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
Proof. Let I = {i : πi(W ) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I s.t. Vi ∩
W ( Vi. In this case we can distinguish if i /∈ JU or not. If i /∈ JU , then the set
S′ = (U∩Vi)γ−1 = Vi. Following the same steps as above, we have γˆi,u(S′) ⊆W1∩Vi,
and so |W1 ∩ Vi| ≥ 2m−r + 1. Then, the r − 1 strong anti-invariance is sufficient to
have a contradiction.
While if i ∈ JU then the proof follows from Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 3.10. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb, with
Vi = (F2)m, 0γ = 0. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
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2. strongly r-anti-invariant.
If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to L(W ), then W1, W2 and W are wall and W1 =W2 = W .
In particular, LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
Proof. Let I = {i : πi(W1) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I s.t. Vi∩W1 (
Vi. First of all, there exists u ∈ Vi ∩W1 non zero. Indeed, as above consider any
u ∈W1 with πi(u) 6= 0. Let S′ = U ∩ Vi, |S′| ≥ 2m−1. From Lemma 3.7 we have that
γˆu(S
′) ⊆ W and |γˆu(S′)| ≥ |S′|/2r ≥ 2. Since uγ ∈ W we have that γˆu(S′) + uγ ⊆
W ∩Vi and thus there exists w 6= 0 in W ∩Vi = (W1∩Vi)γ, implying that there exists
u nonzero in W1 ∩ Vi. Then, let u 6= 0 ∈ W1 ∩ Vi, γˆu(S′) = γˆi,u(S′) ⊆W ∩ Vi, which
implies |W ∩ Vi| ≥ 2m−r−1 + 1 and so dim(W ∩ Vi) ≥ m − r which is not possible
since γi is strongly r-anti-invariant.
Similarly to Lemma 3.8, we can select v¯ ∈ Vi for some i ∈ JU . Then, (W2+ v¯)γ =
W + v¯γ. As above, from the fact that W is a wall and γ is parallel we have that W2
is a wall and W2 =W . From this we have LAU (W1|W2) linear partition.
As before, using the knowledge of the n− 1 dimensional vector space U , we can
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.11. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb,
with Vi = (F2)m, 0γ = 0. Let U be a vector space of dimension n − 1 and suppose
that for all i /∈ JU γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m,
2. strongly r − 1-anti-invariant.
otherwise for j ∈ JU γj
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
2. strongly r-anti-invariant.
If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to L(W ), then W1, W1 and W are wall and W1 =W2 = W .
In particular, LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
Now, we have to analyse the last case, that is, when a linear-affine partition is
mapped into another linear-affine partition by a parallel map.
Lemma 3.12. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb, with
Vi = (F2)m, 0γ = 0.. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
2. strongly r-anti-invariant.
If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to LAU ′ (W ′1|W
′
2), with U and U
′ such that JU ∩ JU ′ =
∅. Then, all the spaces W1,W ′1,W2,W
′
2 are wall and W1 = W
′
1 = W2 = W
′
2. In
particular, both partitions are linear.
Proof. Let I = {i : πi(W1) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I s.t. Vi∩W1 (
Vi. First of all, there exists u ∈ Vi ∩W1 non zero. Indeed, consider any u ∈ W1 with
πi(u) 6= 0. Suppose U ∩ Vi 6= Vi (i.e. i is in JU but not in JU ′). Then (U ′ ∩ Vi) = Vi
and S = (U ′ ∩ Vi)γ−1 = Vi, implying S′ = S ∩ U ∩ Vi = U ∩ Vi (the case U ∩ Vi = Vi
and U ′ ∩ Vi 6= Vi is similar). From Lemma 3.7 we have that γˆu(S′) ⊆ W ′1 and
|γˆu(S′)| ≥ |S′|/2r ≥ 2. Since uγ ∈ W ′1 (W1γ = W
′
1) we have that γˆu(S
′)+uγ ⊆W ′1∩Vi
and thus there exists w 6= 0 in W ′1 ∩ Vi = (W1 ∩ Vi)γ, implying that there exists u
nonzero in W1 ∩ Vi. Then, let u 6= 0 ∈ W1 ∩ Vi, γˆu(S
′) = γˆi,u(S
′) ⊆ W ′1 ∩ Vi, which
implies |W ′1 ∩ Vi| ≥ 2
m−r−1 + 1 and so dim(W ′1 ∩ Vi) ≥ m − r which is not possible,
since γi is strongly r-anti-invariant.
Also in this case, since γ is parallel we have W1 = W
′
1. Note that if i ∈ JU ∪ JU ′
then Vi *W1. Moreover, selecting v¯ ∈ Vi not in U , for some i ∈ JU , since Vi ⊂ U ′ we
have (W2 + v¯)γ = W1 + v¯γ. As in Lemma 3.10 we obtain W2 = W
′
1. While, selecting
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v¯′ ∈ Vi for some i ∈ JU ′ we can follow the steps in the proof of Lemma 3.8 and obtain
W ′2 =W1. From this we have that the two partitions are linear.
If we know a priori the n − 1 dimensional vector spaces U and U ′ then we can
obtain the following.
Corollary 3.13. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1 ⊕ ... ⊕ Vb,
with Vi = (F2)m, 0γ = 0.. Let U,U ′ be two vector spaces of dimension n− 1 and let
JU and JU ′ as above, with JU ∩ JU ′ = ∅. Suppose that for all i /∈ JU ∪ JU ′ γi is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m,
2. strongly r − 1-anti-invariant.
and for j ∈ JU ∪ JU ′ γj is
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
2. strongly r-anti-invariant.
If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to LAU ′(W ′1|W
′
2), with U and U
′ such that JU ∩ JU ′ = ∅.
Then, all the spaces W1,W
′
1,W2,W
′
2 are wall andW1 = W
′
1 = W2 =W
′
2.In particular,
both partitions are linear.
The results obtained in this section show that if we have an APN vectorial Boolean
function, that is a differentially 2-uniform function, then we need only the strong 1-
anti-invariance for the S-boxes γi. As shown in [2], the strong 1-anti-invariance is
equivalent to having nonlinearity different from 0, which is always true for APN
functions (see [11] for more details). However, for even values of m, it is known that
for m = 4 there exist no APN permutations, for m = 6 there exists only one APN
permutation (up to equivalence), and for m ≥ 8 no APN permutations are known. So
the differentially 4-uniform S-boxes represent in these cases (except dimension 6) the
optimal functions with respect to the differential uniformity.
Then, for differentially 4-uniform functions we need that these S-boxes are also
strongly 2-anti-invariant, for applying the previous results. However, in cases such as
m = 4 we have no differentially 4-uniform function which is strongly 2-anti-invariant.
Note that for m = 4, there exist functions which are strongly 2-anti-invariant and also
differentially 6-uniform. With these functions, we would produce the same results
given in the previous lemmas. Indeed, in the proofs, we would have |W ′1 ∩ Vi| ≥
24−1/6 + 1 > 2. However, for higher dimensions 2-anti-invariance and differential
6-uniformity could be not enough. Moreover, we would use known S-boxes with
differential uniformity as low as possible, that in the case of even dimensions, except
m = 6, is 4. For that reason in the following section we investigate the case of
differentially 4-uniform functions, individuating a different property from the anti-
invariance, which is related to the linear structures of the components of an S-box.
3.1. The case of differentially 4-uniform S-boxes. In this section, we want
to focus on differentially 4-uniform maps. We recall that for a given Boolean function
f : Fm → F2 a nonzero vector a ∈ Fm is said a linear structure of f if fˆa is constant.
Let f : Fm → Fm be vectorial Boolean function and consider the following non-
linear measure
nˆ(f) := max
a∈Fm\{0}
|{v ∈ Fm \ {0} | deg(〈fˆa, v〉) = 0}|.
With nˆ(f) we are counting for how many components of f the direction a is a linear
structure.
Let us denote Va = {v ∈ Fm | deg(〈fˆa, v〉) = 0}. We recall the following result
from [1].
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Proposition 3.14. Let f be a vectorial Boolean function over Fm2 , and a ∈ F
m \
{0}. Then, f(a) + V ⊥a is the smallest affine subspace of F
m
2 containing Im(fˆa). In
particular, nˆ(f) = 0 if and only if there does not exist a proper affine subspace of Fm2
containing Im(fˆa), for all a ∈ Fm2 \ {0}.
Thus we can obtain the following results.
Lemma 3.15. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1⊕ ...⊕Vb, 0γ = 0,
with Vi = (F2)m and m ≥ 4. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 4-uniform,
2. nˆ(γi) = 0.
If γ maps L(W ) to LAU (W1|W2) then W and W1 are wall and W = W1 = W2,
implying also that LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
Proof. As before, let I = {i : πi(W1) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I s.t.
Vi ∩W ( Vi. If Vi is also such that Vi ∩ U = Vi (i.e. i /∈ JU ), then the properties on
γi are sufficient to obtain a contradiction. Indeed, we will have that there exist u 6= 0
in W ∩ Vi and since Vi ∩ U = Vi,
γˆi,u(Vi ∩ U) = Im(γˆi,u) ⊂W1 ∩ Vi
and since nˆ(γi) = 0, this implies W1 ∩ Vi = Vi. Thus for all this indexes i we have
V ∩ Vi = W1 ∩ Vi = Vi.
Suppose that Vi ∩ U 6= Vi, then dim(Vi ∩ U) = m− 1. Following the same steps
of the proof of Lemma 3.8, we would have that there exists a nonzero u ∈ W ∩ Vi
and γˆi,u(S) ⊂W1 ∩ Vi with S = (U ∩ Vi)γ−1 and S contains, in this case, half of the
elements of Vi. Thus, dim(W1 ∩ Vi) ≥ m− 2 and also dim(W ∩ Vi) ≥ m− 2.
Now, since there exists v¯ /∈ U with v¯ ∈ Vi, we can choose s ∈ Vi such that sγ = v¯
and then, (W + s)γ = W2 + sγ. Since γ is parallel map we have (W ∩ Vi + s)γ =
(W2 ∩Vi)+ sγ. This implies that dim(W2 ∩Vi) ≥ m− 2. Moreover, for all u ∈W ∩Vi
we have γˆi,u(S
′) ⊂ W2 ∩ Vi, with S
′ = (U + sγ ∩ Vi)γ
−1. Thus, S ∪ S′ = Vi and
Im(γˆi,u) ⊂ (W1 ∪W2) ∩ Vi ⊆ U ∩ Vi 6= Vi. Which is not possible by Proposition 3.14.
The fact that LAU (W1|W2) is linear follows as in Lemma 3.8.
Lemma 3.16. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1⊕ ...⊕Vb, 0γ = 0,
with Vi = (F2)m and m ≥ 4. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 4-uniform,
2. nˆ(γi) = 0.
If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to L(W ) then W and W1 are wall and W = W1 = W2,
implying also that LAU (W1|W2) is linear.
Proof. As before, let I = {i : πi(W1) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I
s.t. Vi ∩W1 ( Vi. If Vi is also such that Vi ∩ U = Vi, then the properties on γi are
sufficient to obtain a contradiction. Indeed, following the proof of Lemma 3.10, there
exists nonzero u ∈ W1 ∩ Vi and will have Im(γˆi,u) ⊂ W ∩ Vi. Since nˆ(γi) = 0, this
implies W ∩ Vi = Vi. Thus for all this indexes i we have V ∩ Vi = W1 ∩ Vi = Vi.
Suppose that Vi ∩ U 6= Vi, then dim(Vi ∩ U) = m− 1. Following the same steps
of the proof of Lemma 3.10, there exists nonzero u ∈ W1 ∩ Vi and we would have
that γˆi,u(S) ⊂ W ∩ Vi with S = (U ∩ Vi) and S contains, in this case, half of the
elements of Vi. As in Lemma 3.10, this implies dim(W ∩ Vi) ≥ m − 2 and thus also
dim(W1 ∩ Vi) ≥ m− 2.
Now, we can choose v¯ ∈ Vi such that v¯ /∈ U and then, (W2 + v¯)γ = W + v¯γ. Since
γ is a parallel map we have (W2 ∩ Vi + v¯)γ = (W ∩ Vi) + v¯γ. This implies that
PRIMITIVITY OF THE GROUP OF A CIPHER 13
dim(W2 ∩Vi) ≥ m− 2. Moreover, for all u ∈W2 ∩Vi we have γˆi,u(S′) ⊂W ∩Vi, with
S′ = (U + v¯) ∩ Vi). Note that S ∪ S′ = Vi.
So, m ≥ 4 and Vi ∩ U 6= Vi imply that W1 ∩W2 ∩ Vi 6= {0}, which means that
there exists u ∈ W1 ∩W2 ∩ Vi nonzero. Thus, Im(γˆi,u) ⊂W ∩ Vi 6= Vi. Which is not
possible since nˆ(γi) = 0.
The fact that LAU (W1|W2) is linear follows as in Lemma 3.10.
Mixing the proofs of the two lemmas above we can obtain the following result.
Lemma 3.17. Let γ = (γ1, ..., γb) be a parallel map over V = V1⊕ ...⊕Vb, 0γ = 0,
with Vi = (F2)m and m ≥ 4. Suppose that for all i γi is
1. differentially 4-uniform,
2. nˆ(γi) = 0.
If γ maps LAU (W1|W2) to LAU ′ (W ′1|W
′
2), with U and U
′ such that JU ∩JU ′ = ∅.
Then W1,2 and W
′
1,2 are wall andW1 = W
′
1 = W2 =W
′
2. In particular, both partitions
are linear.
Proof. As before, let I = {i : πi(W1) 6= {0}}. Suppose that there exists i ∈ I s.t.
Vi ∩W1 ( Vi. We can have the following cases:
1. i /∈ JU ∪ JU ′ ;
2. i in JU but not in JU ′ ;
3. i in JU ′ but not in JU .
CASE 1.
We have that U ∩ Vi = U
′ ∩ Vi = Vi. Then, as in Lemma 3.12 we can determine a
nonzero element u ∈ Vi ∩W1 and
γˆi,u(Vi ∩ U) = Im(γˆi,u) ⊂W1 ∩ Vi.
Which is not possible since nˆ(γi) = 0.
CASE 2. We have that U ∩Vi = Vi and U ′ ∩Vi 6= Vi. Then there exists v¯′ ∈ Vi with
v¯′ /∈ U ′. We can define the sets S = (U ′ ∩ Vi)γ−1 and S′ = (U ′ + v¯′ ∩ Vi)γ−1, both
containing 2m−1 elements and S ∪ S′ = Vi.
Then, as in Lemma 3.12, we can determine a nonzero element u ∈ Vi ∩W1 and
γˆi,u(S) ⊂ W ′1 ∩ Vi while γˆi,u(S
′) ⊂ W ′2 ∩ Vi. Thus Im(γˆi,u) ⊂ U
′ ∩ Vi 6= Vi, which is
not possible since nˆ(γi) = 0.
CASE 3.
We have that U ∩ Vi 6= Vi and U ′ ∩ Vi = Vi. Then, there exists v¯ ∈ Vi with v¯ /∈ U .
We can define the sets S = (U ∩ Vi) and S′ = (U + v¯ ∩ Vi), both containing 2m−1
elements and S ∪ S′ = Vi.
As in Lemma 3.12 we can determine a nonzero element u ∈ Vi∩W1 and γˆi,u(S) ⊂
W ′1 ∩ Vi, implying dim(W1 ∩ Vi) = dim(W
′
1 ∩ Vi) ≥ m− 2.
Moreover since v¯ ∈ Vi we have v¯γ ∈ U ′ and thus (W2 + v¯)γ = W ′1 + v¯γ. Since
γ is a parallel map we have (W2 ∩ Vi + v¯)γ = (W
′
1 ∩ Vi) + v¯γ. This implies that
dim(W2 ∩ Vi) ≥ m− 2. So, m ≥ 4 and Vi ∩ U 6= Vi imply that W1 ∩W2 ∩ Vi 6= {0},
that means that there exists u ∈ W1 ∩W2 ∩ Vi nonzero. For such an element u we
obtain
Im(γˆi,u) ⊂W
′
1 ∩ Vi 6= Vi.
Which is not possible since nˆ(γi) = 0.
The conclusion that all the space coincides and are wall follows similarly to the
previous two lemmas.
Remark 3.18. In dimension 4 there exist several permutations which are differen-
tially 4-uniform and such that nˆ(f) = 0. Moreover, for any dimension m the inversion
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map γ : x 7→ x−1 is differentially 4-uniform if m is even and APN if m is odd, and
the it is such that nˆ(γ) = 0 for any dimension m (see for instance [18, Corollary 6]).
3.2. Primitivity of Γ(C) in the case of subgroups of order 2n−1. Using the
results above we can define the following property for a key-schedule of a tb cipher.
Definition 3.19. Let C be a tb cipher over V , with key space K. Let ℓ be the
number of the rounds. Let T1, T2 and T3 be three subgroups of T (V ) of order at least
2n−1 and Uj = {v : σv ∈ Tj} for j = 1, 2, 3. If there exists 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1 such that for
any (ki−1, ki, ki+1) ∈ U1 ×U2 ×U3 the element (k¯1, ..., k¯i−2, ki−1, ki, ki+1, k¯i+2, ..., k¯ℓ)
is in Im(Φ), where the values k¯j’s are fixed, the key-schedule Φ is said 3-round almost-
independent at round i with respect to T1, T2 and T3.
An easy example of a 3-round almost-independent key-schedule is given by the
following. Let f1, f2 and f3 be three fixed linear Boolean functions from Fn2 to F2.
Then, a map
Φ : F4n2 → F
ℓn
2
(k1, k2, k3, k4) 7→ (k1, k2, k3,Φ
′(f1(k1), f2(k2), f(k3), k4)),
with Φ′ any function from F3+n2 to F
(ℓ−3)n
2 , satisfies the 3-round almost-independent
property (the groups T1, T2, T3 depend on the functions f1, f2, f3).
For the mixing layer it is easy to extend Proposition 2.8 to the case of linear-affine
partitions.
Proposition 3.20. Let λ be a linear permutation of V , and let LAU (W1|W2) be
a linear-affine partition of V . Then LAU (W1|W2)λ = LAUλ(W1λ|W2λ).
From the analysis reported above we are able to state the following result.
Theorem 3.21. Let C be a tb cipher with a key-schedule function Φ 3-round
almost-independent at round i with respect to T1, T2 and T3, for some 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1
and T1, T2 and T3 subgroups of T (V ) of order at least 2
n−1. Let Uj = {v : σv ∈ Tj}
for j = 1, 2, 3. If the parallel S-boxes of round i and round i + 1, γi and γi+1, are
composed by S-boxes which are
1. differentially 2r-uniform, with r < m− 1,
2. strongly r-anti-invariant;
or
(i) differentially 4-uniform,
(ii) nˆ(γi) = nˆ(γi+1) = 0,
λi is strongly proper and JU2λ−1i
∩JU1 = ∅, then there do not exist A and B non-trivial
partitions such that for all k ∈ K the map τk maps A onto B. In particular, Γ(C) is
primitive.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.3, with the only difference
that in this case the partitions A1,A2 and A3 can be also linear-affine.
Since Φ is 3-round almost-independent at round i with respect to T1, T2, T3,
there exist some fixed values k¯j , with j ∈ {1, ..., ℓ} \ {i − 1, i, i + 1}, such that
(k¯1, ...ki−1, ki, ki+1, ..., k¯ℓ) is in Im(Φ), for any (ki−1, ki, ki+1) ∈ U1 × U2 × U3.
Denote τj = γjλj , and consider the encryption maps
(3.2) τK = τ¯1σki−1γiλiσkiγi+1λi+1σki+1 τ¯2,
where τ¯1 = τ1σk¯1 · · · τi−2σk¯i−2τi−1, τ¯2 = τi+2σk¯i+2 · · · τℓσk¯ℓ , and (ki−1, ki, ki+1) ∈
U1 × U2 × U3.
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Suppose that all the encryption functions map A into B. Denoting by A1 = Aτ¯1
and B′ = Bρ−1 with ρ = τiτi+1τ¯2, we have that, for all ki−1 ∈ U1, σki−1 maps A1
into B′. From Proposition 3.6 follows that A1 = B′ and it is linear or linear-affine.
Similarly, the partitions A2 = A1τi and A3 = A2τi+1 are linear or linear-affine.
Now, suppose that all these partitions are linear-affine (the proof for the other pos-
sible cases follows in a similar way). Then A1 = LAU1(W1|W2), A2 = LAU2(W
′
1|W
′
2)
and A1 = LAU3(W
′′
1 |W
′′
2 ) where W1,2 ⊆ U1, W
′
1,2 ⊆ U2 and W
′′
1,2 ⊆ U3.
From Proposition 3.20 we have that γi maps the partition LAU1(W1|W2) into
LAU2λ−1i
(W ′1λ
−1
i |W
′
2λ
−1
i ). Thus, from Lemma 3.12 or Lemma 3.17 we have that
W1 and W
′
1λ
−1
i are wall, and in addition the two partitions are linear. Thus, we
have that A2 = L(W ′1) and, now, γi+1 maps the partition L(W
′
1) into the partition
LAU3λ−1i+1
(W ′′1 λ
−1
i+1|W
′′
2 λ
−1
i+1). From Lemma 3.8 or Lemma 3.15, we have that also W
′
1
is a wall, contradiction.
We can note that if any of the three groups is the translation group T (V ), then
one of the partition Ai can be only linear. Using this fact, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.22. Let C be a tb cipher with a key-schedule Φ 3-round almost-
independent at round i with respect to T1, T2 and T3, for some 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1. Suppose
that for one j, Tj = T (V ). If the parallel S-boxes of round i and round i + 1 satisfy
the conditions of Theorem 3.21 and λi is strongly proper, then Γ(C) is primitive.
Proof. As in Theorem 3.21, we have the partitions A1,A2 and A3. Suppose
that T1 = (V ), and then A1 = L(W ) is linear. Thus, we can apply Lemma 3.8 or
Lemma 3.15. From this, we have thatW is a wall and A2 is linear with A2 = L(Wλi).
Again, we can apply Lemma 3.8 or Lemma 3.15 obtaining that Wλi is a wall.
Now, suppose T2 = T (V ) and A2 = L(W ). From Lemma 3.10 or Lemma 3.16
we have that A1 is linear and Wλ
−1
i is a wall. Then, applying always Lemma 3.8 or
Lemma 3.15 we can obtain that also W is a wall.
For the last case, we have A3 = L(W ). Then, γi+1 maps A2 (linear or linear-
affine) into L(Wλ−1i+1). We can apply Lemma 3.10 or Lemma 3.16 to have that A2
is linear with A2 = L(W ′) and W ′ = Wλ
−1
i+1 a wall. Now, using Lemma 3.10 or
Lemma 3.16 we can also obtain that A1 = L(W ′λ
−1
i ) and also W
′λ−1i is a wall. In
all the cases we obtain a contradiction to the fact that λi is strongly proper.
4. Conclusion. In this paper we presented a first study on determining the
properties of the key-schedule algorithm that permits to obtain the primitivity for the
group generated by the encryption of a cipher C. In particular, with a key-schedule
which generates (at least) 23n−3 sequences of round keys we provided cryptographic
properties for the components of the round functions for guaranteeing the primitiv-
ity. For the case of 4-uniform permutations, we individuate an alternative property,
instead of the strongly anti-invariance, which is much easier to check for dimensions
greater than 4.
It would be interesting to further study the properties for a key-schedule in order
to obtain similar results with a number of round keys sequences smaller than 23n−3.
For example, for the well known cipher AES we can have only 2n or 22n sequences.
In [4] (see also [5]) the authors generalized the idea of the primitive trapdoor and
used the linear partitions for designing a trapdoored block cipher so that the round
functions γλ maps a linear partition into another one.
From the study carried out here, we have also that if we would implement a
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partition-based trapdoor which works not for all possible the round keys, but just for
half of them, then we could use also the linear-affine partitions to design a trapdoored
cipher. Thanks to results gave in this work, we have individuated properties on the
components of the cipher so that such a scenario is not possible.
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